

assumption in Richard's approach, namely that 'what a sentence's utterance says determines the utterance's truth conditions, so that a sentence utterance could not say something which might be false in a situation in which the sentence as uttered was true' (p. 611). The principle is incorrect as a description of our practice of indirect reporting.

2. *Reply to Reimer*

Reimer's main complaint about our paper is that we focus on the wrong set of intuitions. Semanticists should be concerned with intuitions about what sentence types mean relative to contexts of utterance, she says, and not with intuitions about what is said by an utterance of a sentence.

Again, we emphasize how important it is to keep in mind the goals of our paper. From our objections to a certain alleged connection between the semantic content of utterances and their indirect reports, it does not follow that we can have no intuitions about the literal meaning of sentence types.²

Reimer agrees with us that we 'do not have a practice of reporting... sentence-types relativized to contexts' and that 'whatever intuitions we have about the contextually relativized content of sentence-types are derived from what we think about utterances of sentence in contexts' (p. 603). Such intuitions, she thinks, provide the pre-theoretic basis for semantics.

There are two ways to understand her latter claim.

On a strong reading, it requires that our intuitions are capable of systematically distinguishing between those features of true indirect reports that reflect the literal meaning of the uttered sentence-type from those that do not. For reasons offered in our paper and pursued in our reply above to Richard, we doubt that such an account is forthcoming.

On a weaker interpretation, all it says is that if we think about what was said by an utterance, we will end up with intuitions about the literal meaning of utterance types. Though no doubt true (we'll end up with all sorts of intuitions), this cannot provide the basis for a systematic connection between semantic content (of sentence-types) and indirect speech.

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² One of us thinks that all philosophical appeals to intuitions are suspect, a view not argued for in 'On an Alleged Connection'. See Cappelen and Winblad 'Intuitions', forthcoming.