

we write

$$\rho_i \equiv \frac{a_i}{1 + a_i}, \quad \pi_i \equiv \frac{a_{i+1}p_{i+1}}{(1 + a_i)p_i}$$

Hence, ρ_i is proportional to the receivables to sales ratio, while π_i is proportional to the payables to sales ratio. Hence, ε is the elasticity of ρ_i with respect to π_i . Let

$$\varepsilon(i, i + 1) \equiv \frac{(\rho_{i+1} - \rho_i) / \rho_i}{(\pi_{i+1} - \pi_i) / \pi_i} \quad (22)$$

$\varepsilon(i, i + 1)$ is the elasticity of the receivables to sales ratio with respect to the payables to sales ratio going upstream from firm i to firm $i + 1$. Using our solution for the optimal contract,

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon(i, i + 1) &= \frac{\frac{a_{i+1}}{1+a_{i+1}} \frac{1+a_i}{a_i} - 1}{\frac{a_{i+2}p_{i+2}}{a_{i+1}p_{i+1}} \frac{(1+a_i)p_i}{(1+a_{i+1})p_{i+1}} - 1} \\ &= \frac{\frac{a_{i+1}}{a_i} - 1}{(1 + a_i) p_i \frac{a_{i+2}p_{i+2}}{a_{i+1}p_{i+1}} - 1 - a_{i+1}} \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

We are interested in how $\varepsilon(i, i + 1)$ changes as w_i becomes large. We know from our solutions for a_k and p_k that all quantities with subscripts $i + 1$ and higher are unaffected by changes in w_i . As w_i becomes large, the numerator of (23) is bounded away from zero. However, the denominator of (23) increases without bound. Hence $\varepsilon(i, i + 1) \rightarrow 0$ as $w_i \rightarrow 0$.

In other words, as the size of firm i increases for any fixed profile of firm sizes upstream from i , the elasticity $\varepsilon(i, i + 1)$ becomes small. By selecting a profile for firm sizes $\{w_i\}$ that increases sufficiently quickly going downstream in the production chain, we can make the elasticities $\{\varepsilon(i, i + 1)\}$ as low as we please.

In particular, if we confine our attention to size profiles $\{w_i\}$ that give rise to constant elasticities along the production chain so that $\varepsilon(i, i + 1) = \varepsilon$, for all i , a low cross-section elasticity ε is associated with a high degree of vertical integration. Our reasoning suggests the following hypothesis.